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Abstract 
Developmental theories suggest that children initially conceptualize God in concrete, 
anthropomorphic terms.  In contrast, recent research has found that from early on, children 
recognize God as a being radically different from humans.  Previous research has been limited to 
studies of Christian children.  The present study questioned children and adults raised in a 
religious tradition (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) emphasizing God’s 
anthropomorphic qualities and a comparison group of traditional Christian children and adults, 
concerning abilities of God and dad.  The results indicate that children distinguish between God 
and dad in terms of supernatural ability and that regardless of religious background, children 
acquire God concepts in a piece-meal fashion, not automatically inferring one supernatural 
attribute given another.  In addition, theological differences in God concepts between the two 
religious traditions emerge late in development. 
 
 iii
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. Approaches to the Development of Religious Concepts ................................................ 1 
1.2. Omniscience and Immortality......................................................................................... 5 
1.3. Limitations of Previous Research ................................................................................... 6 
1.4. Traditional Christian and LDS Theologies ..................................................................... 6 
2. METHOD ............................................................................................................................. 10 
2.1. Participants.................................................................................................................... 10 
2.2. Procedure ...................................................................................................................... 10 
3. RESULTS ............................................................................................................................. 12 
3.1. Preliminary Analyses .................................................................................................... 13 
3.2. Do children distinguish between God and dad? ........................................................... 13 
3.3. Are there any religious differences in distinguishing between God and Dad?............. 14 
3.4. Do LDS children inflate the powers of Dad?................................................................ 15 
3.5. Do LDS children depreciate God’s extraordinary powers?.......................................... 16 
3.6. Domain-specific Analyses ............................................................................................ 17 
3.6.1. Knowledge ............................................................................................................ 19 
3.6.2. Physicality............................................................................................................. 20 
3.6.3. Power .................................................................................................................... 21 
3.6.4. Biology.................................................................................................................. 22 
3.7. Validity of Domains...................................................................................................... 24 
3.8. Explanations.................................................................................................................. 25 
3.9. Theological Tenets........................................................................................................ 26 
4. DISCUSSION....................................................................................................................... 28 
APPENDIX................................................................................................................................... 34 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL ...................................................................................................... 34 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 41 
 
 
 iv
  
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 1:  Factor loadings............................................................................................................... 25 
Table 2: Percentage of adults within each religious tradition responding that God only has the 
extraordinary ability.............................................................................................................. 27 
Table 3:  Percentage of adults within each religious tradition responding that dad only has the 
natural biological property.................................................................................................... 28 
 
 
 v
  
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1:  Mean extraordinary attributions to dad and God of younger and older children. ........ 14 
Figure 2:  Overall supernatural attributions to God and dad by age and religious affiliation. ..... 15 
Figure 3:  Attribution of extraordinary ability to dad by age and religious affiliation. ................ 16 
Figure 4:  Attributions to God and dad by domain. ...................................................................... 18 
Figure 5:  Attributions of extraordinary biological properties by age and religious affiliation.... 23 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi
  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The abstract, metaphysical nature of God has long been considered to be beyond the grasp of 
young children.  Developmental theories suggest that children initially conceptualize God in 
concrete, anthropomorphic terms, for example, God as a bearded man in the sky.  In contrast, 
recent research has found that from early on, children recognize God as a being radically 
different from humans.  The present study seeks to further this understanding of the structure and 
content of developing God concepts as well as to examine the influence of religious tradition and 
instruction. 
1.1. Approaches to the Development of Religious Concepts  
The traditional account of the development of religious concepts proposes that magical beliefs 
stem from confusion between the natural and the supernatural and has emphasized the initial 
anthropomorphism of God concepts.  More specifically, both Piaget (1929) and Freud (1950) 
claim that children initially conflate the human and the divine. 
   Piaget’s theory of the development of God concepts suggests that children are confused 
about the distinction between God and people in general, not just parents.  Not only do children 
attribute supernatural or extraordinary properties to both God and people, but children also 
attribute human properties to God, demonstrating a general confusion between the natural or 
ordinary and the extraordinary.  In The Child’s Conception of the World, Piaget comments that 
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 “[t]he child in extreme youth is driven to endow its parents with all of those attributes which 
theological doctrines assign to their divinities – sanctity, supreme power, omniscience, eternity, 
and even ubiquity” (p. 378, 1929).  Piaget identifies age 6 as the point of major developmental 
change, as children at this age come to see people as fallible, subject to limitations, and thus 
distinct from God who retains the extraordinary properties bestowed earlier.  Additionally, Piaget 
claims that with development, children move toward a more abstract understanding of God, 
further differentiating God from people in terms of the ordinary properties that characterize 
humans.    
Freud (1950) also proposes an early generic confusion inherent in concepts of God, but 
his theory differs from that of Piaget in that a child’s idea of God does not stem from a generic 
understanding of people, but from the child’s relationship with the father as a figure of authority.  
Freud proposes that “the god of each of them [individual human beings] is formed in the likeness 
of his father, that his personal relation to God depends on his relation to his father in the flesh 
and oscillates and changes with that relation, and at the bottom God is nothing other than an 
exalted father” (p. 147).  According to this view, the father is deified and with development, God 
takes the place of the father as a figure of authority and power.  For Freud, the father in particular 
serves as the foundation for the God concept.  
 Research following in the traditions of Piaget and Freud has supported the idea that 
children’s initial conceptualization of God is anthropomorphic (see Barrett & Richert, 2003 for a 
review; Coles, 1990; Goldman, 1964, Heller, 1986).  As pointed out by Barrett (2001) and by 
Boyer and Walker (2000), the methodologies employed in these studies, however, may have 
biased children toward anthropomorphic responses since the studies did not apply the methods 
equivalently across children of different ages.  Children’s performance on tasks that ask them to 
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 draw pictures of and tell stories about God have been compared with adults’ responses to 
questionnaires rather than adults’ performance on comparable tasks.  This comparison yields the 
appearance of an anthropomorphic to abstract shift in God concepts, although it has yet to be 
determined if adults would also demonstrate anthropomorphism if asked to draw pictures of or 
tell stories about God.  Research by Barrett and Keil (1996) suggests that adults do rely on 
anthropomorphic God concepts in narrative tasks that require on-line processing. 
 Recent cognitive developmental research has challenged the idea that young children 
fundamentally confuse the natural with the supernatural.  Instead, children are reported to gain an 
early intuitive understanding of the way the world ordinarily works and recognize violations of 
these assumptions.  For example, research in the area of theory of mind has shown that children 
also understand that a desire cannot lead to action at a distance.  Thus young children are not 
generally prone to magical thinking (Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Harris, 2000; Sharon & 
Woolley, 2002; Taylor, 1999; Wellman & Gelman, 1998; Woolley, 1997).  That is, children 
expect things in the world to operate a certain way and when anomalous events do occur, they 
perceive such events as violations.   
 Researchers in the cognitive science of religion claim that religious concepts rely on 
ordinary cognition (Barrett, 2000b; Boyer, 1994, 2001; Lawson & McCauley, 1990).  Children 
recognize deviations from expectations, and it is these deviations that form the basis for religious 
representations (Boyer, 1995, 2001; Boyer & Walker, 2000).  Boyer proposes that religious 
concepts involve a violation of the assumptions that underlie intuitive theories as well as default 
assumptions.  For example, the concept of a ghost involves the ontological category of 
person/human.  A ghost can pass through solid objects thus violating assumptions about the 
physical properties of people, but maintaining the psychological properties of that category.  For 
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 Boyer, regardless of age, God is understood as an amalgam of violations and default intuitive 
expectations. 
Recent research on the development of God concepts has been inspired by both the 
cognitive approach to religion, as exemplified in Boyer’s theory, and recent research in cognitive 
development.  Drawing on research in the area of theory of mind, Barrett, Richert, and Driesenga 
(2001) conducted several studies to examine how children’s understanding of God’s beliefs 
versus mother’s develops.  They hypothesized that if children’s God concepts are characterized 
by anthropomorphism, the constraints children ascribe to humans will also be ascribed to God, 
but if children understand God to be an agent of a sort that differs from a human agent, then 
children may not extend human constraints to God.  To test this hypothesis, Barrett et al 
employed false belief tasks to determine if children, once they understood that mom’s knowledge 
is constrained, would extend this limitation to God (anthropomorphically God as similarly 
limited) or would appreciate God’s distinctly superhuman omniscience.  In the two false-belief 
experiments, children ranging in age from 3 to 6 years were presented with a cracker box that 
contained rocks and a closed brown paper bag that contained crackers.  Children were shown the 
cracker box and asked what they thought was inside, the appropriate answer being “crackers.”  
The children were then shown the actual contents of the box, i.e., rocks, and that the crackers 
were actually in a paper bag.  After the containers were closed, the children were asked the 
standard false-belief questions about what their mothers would think was in the cracker box.  
Consistent with other theory of mind research (Wellman & Gelman, 1998), most of the 3- and 4-
year-olds said that their mothers would think that there were rocks inside the box, whereas the 5- 
and 6-year-olds attributed false-belief to their mothers, saying that mom would think that there 
were crackers in the box.  However, when children were asked the same question about God, the 
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 same pattern did not emerge.  Regardless of age, children answered that God would know what 
was actually inside of the box. 
At first glance, results of Barrett et al appear to agree with Piaget, but on closer 
examination the results suggest that children are distinguishing between mom and God by 5 
years of age, earlier than Piaget suggests.  In addition, Barrett et al.’s construal of the 
development of God concepts differs from Piaget’s in terms of domain specificity.  Whereas 
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development suggests that the development of children’s God 
concepts will like-wise demonstrate broad changes, Barrett et al claim that the development of 
the God concept develops in a more piece-meal fashion.  That is, the God concept is composed 
of knowledge from different domains.  As an agent concept, the representation of God 
incorporates the domains of intuitive psychology, biology, as well as physics.  As knowledge in 
these different domains changes, so will children’s concept of God, but theories concerning this 
knowledge do not change all at once, as Piaget would suggest. 
1.2. Omniscience and Immortality 
Gimenez, Guerrero, and Harris (2000) extended the Barrett et al research in two ways.  First, in 
addition to looking at children’s attributions of omniscience, they looked at attributions of 
immortality to a friend and God.  Second, they were also interested in examining the influence of 
explicit religious education by drawing participants from two different schools, a Catholic school 
with explicit religious instruction, and a secular school that did not include such instruction.  
Gimenez et al asked 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children if psychological (knowledge) or biological 
(life) constraints applied to God and their best friend.  Overall, the results demonstrated that 
regardless of type of school attended, 3-year-olds failed to distinguish between God and their 
friend, whereas 5-year-olds attributed psychological and biological constraints to their best friend 
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 but not to God.  Thus, the context of religious instruction did not appear to affect the 
development of children’s God concepts.  Children seem prepared to pick up God concepts from 
the general cultural environment without any special religious instruction. 
1.3. Limitations of Previous Research 
Taken together, the research thus far suggests that God is distinguished from humans early in 
development.  However, this research has been limited in several respects.  First, the previous 
research has looked at God concepts in contrast to the understanding of mothers and friends.  
However, traditionally and as Freud suggests, it is fathers that have been regarded as the 
prototype for God.  On this account, it may be that God is more readily differentiated from 
friends and mother than from father.  The present study explores this possibility.  Second, 
previous research focused on extraordinary mental attributes and immortality, but did not 
explicitly consider other properties typically attributed to God, such as immateriality and 
omnipotence. Third, the previous studies have been limited to children from traditional Christian 
backgrounds who have been exposed to concepts of God that emphasize the distinction between 
God and humans, particularly in terms of God’s attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and 
immortality.  The present study examines the development of God concepts in children raised in 
a religious context that emphasizes anthropomorphic qualities of God as a personified, embodied 
heavenly father. 
1.4. Traditional Christian and LDS Theologies  
In theology and religious education, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS) 
emphasizes that God is an embodied, Heavenly Father.  According to LDS theology, God was 
once a man, but has evolved into a deity.  God not only has a physical body, but also is subject to 
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 the laws and principles of the universe, limited in power and in knowledge, mutable, contingent, 
and not omnipresent (Beckwith & Parrish, 1991).  God exercises his power through natural laws, 
although what is accomplished may be perceived by people to be miracles.  God’s knowledge is 
limited, but is aided by intermediaries such as angels, and that knowledge continues to increase 
as the future unfolds.  Since God is embodied, God cannot be omnipresent.  God’s influence, 
however, may be omnipresent by means of other agents or intermediaries that reflect God, such 
as angels, prophets, apostles, and teachers (Beckwith & Parrish, 1991). 
 Through LDS religious education, this theology is introduced to children starting at an 
early age, beginning officially at 18 months when children attend nursery school during part of 
the LDS worship service.  From age three through seven, children continue their religious 
education by attending a set of lessons called Primary (Money, 2002).  The lessons that are 
taught are specified in a manual that every teacher receives (Primary 1, 1996; Primary 2, 1995).  
In Primary 1: I Am a Child of God (1996), children from 18 months to 3 years are taught basic 
LDS theology.  For example, the first lesson concerns the idea that children are spirit children of 
Heavenly Father and instructs teachers to explain to children that “just as animals grow up to be 
like their parents, we will grow up to be like our parents.  Heavenly Father is the father of our 
spirits, so we can grow to be like him” (Primary 1, p.2).   The physicality of God is emphasized 
as early as the second lesson, the purpose of the lesson being “[t]o help each child understand 
that Heavenly Father is a real person, with a real body of flesh and bones, and that we are made 
in his image” (p. 4).  The Primary teacher manuals suggest that, at least some aspects of LDS 
theology (God’s embodiment) are explicitly taught.  Additionally, the lessons promoting these 
aspects of LDS doctrine are taught repeatedly throughout the Primary years (ages 3-7) and are 
also reinforced through songs and activities (Money, 2002). 
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  In Traditional Christian theology, God’s properties include, omniscience, or possessing 
unlimited knowledge, immateriality, or lacking physical constraints, and omnipotence, or having 
unlimited power in terms of causal influence on the world, and immortality.  Thus the, four 
characteristics that define the traditional Christian God concept were identified as omniscience, 
immateriality, omnipotence, and immortality or lack of biological constraints.  In contrast to 
these characteristics, LDS theology conceptualizes God as material and limited in knowledge 
and power (Beckwith & Parrish, 1991).  These differences between Traditional Christian and 
LDS theologies guided the design of the present study.  It was hypothesized that LDS 
participants would differ from traditional Christian participants in attributing omniscience, 
immateriality, omnipotence, and immortality to God, with immateriality and immortality 
hypothesized as being especially likely to differ between the two groups.  Since many Latter Day 
Saints acknowledge that God is omniscient, but only so with the help of intermediaries, and 
omnipotent, but only within the constraints of universal laws, it was decided to include forced-
choice questions to clarify the underlying understanding behind the answers to the initial 
questions.  
The present study examines different theories concerning the development of God 
concepts with children from different religious backgrounds.  Previous research on God concepts 
has focused on the contrast between God and either mom or a friend, but not dad.  If Freud’s 
theory is accurate, a religious tradition with emphases on God as an embodied Father and a 
traditional family structure should promote an early tendency to confuse God and dad.  Previous 
research on God concepts has been limited to examining a narrow range of supernatural 
attributes.  The present study extends this research by looking at a wide range of attributed across 
multiple domains.  By including a religious tradition with a theology emphasizing a distinctly 
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 anthropomorphic God, the present study seeks to explore when and how theology is playing a 
role in the acquisition and development of God concepts.   
 The present study sets out to determine how readily children would acquire God concepts 
that either resemble or contrast that of a human father in the context of different religious 
traditions.  To test for possible differences in the development of God concepts, children, aged 4 
– 6 years, and adults from Traditional Christian (Protestant and Roman Catholic) and Latter Day 
Saints backgrounds were questioned about psychological, physical, and biological properties of 
God and a human father.  The questions included both extraordinary characteristics that violate 
intuitive assumptions for the ontological category of person, as well as ordinary abilities and 
constraints for that category. 
The questions this research addresses are the following: 
1. Will children distinguish God from dad as they have been shown to do with mom and a 
friend? 
2. Concerning God, will LDS children demonstrate a more anthropomorphic God concept 
than will Traditional Christian children? 
3. Will LDS children attribute more extraordinary properties to dad than will Traditional 
Christian children? 
4. Will children disregard domain in making attributions as Piaget’s idea of general 
confusion would suggest, or will extraordinary attributes be applied differentially by 
domain? 
5. Are differences in attribution of extraordinary properties related to differences in 
particular theological tenets? 
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 2. METHOD 
 
2.1. Participants 
A total of 93 children ranging in age from 4 years, 0 months to 6 years, 11 months, and 54 adults 
served as participants in this study.  The 48 LDS children were recruited through Latter Day 
Saints connections of collaborators in Utah.  The 16 LDS adults were recruited from a university 
in Utah.  The 45 Christian children were recruited from a pre-school and after-school program in 
suburban Western Pennsylvania.  The remaining 38 adults were recruited from a psychology 
class at an urban university in Western Pennsylvania.  Nine of the adult participants identified 
themselves as other than Christian, i.e., atheist, agnostic, Jewish, etc., and their data was 
excluded from the analyses.  In addition, data was excluded from children whose dates of birth 
were not available.  To ensure that the child age groups from each religious tradition were of 
equivalent size and had similar mean ages, children were first sorted by age.  Then, several 
subjects, aged 5 years, six months, were randomly selected to be excluded.  The analyses include 
45 adults (16 LDS, with a mean age of 22 years and 29 TC, with a mean age of 22 years), 38 
older children (19 LDS, with a mean age of 4.73 years and 19 TC, with a mean age of 4.96 
years), and 44 younger children (22 LDS, with a mean age of 6.15 years and 22 TC, with a mean 
age of 5.87 years). 
2.2. Procedure 
Each child was individually tested by the experimenter in a quiet room or area of the pre-school.  
A pre-test was administered in which each child was asked if he or she knew who God was.  If a 
10 
 child answered “Jesus” to this pretest question, the experimenter made sure that the child 
understood that the question was asking about God in heaven and not Jesus.  The children were 
also told that sometimes they might think that God and daddy can do the same things and 
sometimes they might think that God and daddy can do different things, to avoid possible bias in 
their responses.  
 Following the pretest, the child was asked questions about the abilities of God and daddy 
in terms of knowledge, physicality, power, and biology.  These four categories of items were 
derived from the four characteristics of God in traditional Christian theology: omniscience, 
immateriality, omnipotence, and immortality.  For each group, three items were generated, 
resulting in 12 questions overall for the task.  The items were randomly presented and the order 
of character presentation was counterbalanced across participants.  For each item within the 
larger category, with the exception of the biological items, the child was initially asked a yes/no 
question concerning whether the character (God or daddy) would be able to perform the 
supernatural action in question.  After each answer, an appropriate forced-choice question was 
asked to determine whether the child explained the character’s performance as being do to 
supernatural versus natural causes.  The order of the choices in the forced-choice questions was 
also counter-balanced across participants.  The same initial question was then asked about the 
other character (daddy or God).  For the three biological items, only forced-choice questions 
were asked.(See Appendix).   
 The knowledge items involved questions about abilities that in some way violate how 
people understand how ordinary human psychology works.  These items included questions 
about mind reading, prayer, and knowledge of all the books in the world.  For example, children 
were asked if God or daddy knew what they were thinking at that moment.  The physicality 
11 
 items asked about extraordinary actions that depend upon a lack of physical constraints.  Items in 
this category included invisibility, the ability to walk through walls, and omnipresence.  For 
example, children were asked if God or daddy could be at home, at work, and at school all at the 
same time.  The power items asked about the ability of God and daddy to act on the world by 
extraordinary means.  For example, children were asked if God or daddy could turn a rock into a 
real puppy.  Items included in this category were lifting a mountain, magical transformation, and 
healing. 
 The biological items differed from the other items in that a preliminary yes/no question 
about an extraordinary ability was not asked.  The biological items included forced-choice 
questions about whether or not God or daddy is constrained by biology.  Since LDS theology 
emphasizes that God is embodied, whereas TC theology depicts God as disembodied, the 
biological items were presented to determine the influence of these explicit theological tenets on 
whether or not God is understood as embodied.  These items included having once been a baby, 
needing to eat and drink, and having a body with arms and legs. 
3. RESULTS 
 
Participants’ responses were scored as “1” for an extraordinary attribution (yes) and 0 for an 
ordinary attribution (no).  Judgments for three items in each domain were summed (ranging from 
0 to 3) for a domain score.  Mean scores across domains constitute an overall extraordinary 
ability judgment score. 
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 3.1. Preliminary Analyses 
Independent samples t-tests revealed that within the older age group, the LDS children (M = 6.15 
years, SD = .375) were significantly older than the TC children (M = 5.87 years, SD = .358), t 
(36) = 2.376, p = .023.  Within the younger group of children, the opposite pattern occurred, with 
the LDS children being (M = 4.73 years, SD = .460) significantly younger than the TC children 
(M = 4.96 years, SD = .210), t (42) = -2.184, p = .035. 
 To assess possible effects of these age differences two analyses were compared.  First, a 
separate 3-way religious affiliation x character x attribute ANOVA was run for each of the age 
groups.  Second, an ANCOVA using age in days as a covariate, but including the same three 
factors as the ANOVA was run.  Comparing the two analyses, the results of the ANCOVA for 
each age group were identical to the results of the ANOVA in terms of which effects were 
significant and which effects were not significant.  In addition, the covariate in the ANCOVA 
was not significant for both of the age groups, indicating that the exact age of children within the 
same age group is not significantly related to their responses on the dependent variable.   
3.2. Do children distinguish between God and dad? 
Figure 1 presents children’s overall attributions of extraordinary abilities to God versus Dad by 
age.  A 2-way character x age ANOVA confirms a significant main effect of character, F (1, 
124) = 1061.26, p < .0001.  Children clearly distinguished between God and dad in terms of the 
attribution of extraordinary ability.  In addition, there was a significant main effect of age, F (2, 
124) = 7.90, p = .001.  The character x age interaction was also significant, F (2, 124) = 33.95, p 
< .0001.  Although even the youngest children significantly distinguished God from dad in terms 
of extraordinary ability, this distinction became greater with age.     
13 
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Figure 1:  Mean extraordinary attributions to dad and God of younger and older children. 
 
 
3.3. Are there any religious differences in distinguishing between God and Dad? 
Although children distinguish between dad and God, this distinction may not be the same for 
children from LDS and TC religious backgrounds.  To determine if religious background 
influences this distinction, a 3-way character x age x religious affiliation ANOVA was run 
looking only at the child groups.  No significant effects of religion were found.   
What about the judgments of adults?  Figure 2 depicts judgments by age and character for 
all age groups.  Overall, these results show very similar patterns across age for both religious 
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 groups.  With the adult group added to the ANOVA, however, a significant religion x age 
interaction appeared, F (2, 121) = 4.039, p = .020. 
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Figure 2:  Overall supernatural attributions to God and dad by age and religious affiliation. 
 
 
 
3.4. Do LDS children inflate the powers of Dad? 
Although children in both religious groups appreciated God’s distinctly extraordinary powers, 
LDS children exhibited a small but significant tendency to inflate Dad’s abilities (See Figure 3).  
A 2-way age x religious affiliation ANOVA looking at responses for dad only revealed a 
significant main effect of age, F (1, 78) = 15.056, p < .0001, and religious affiliation, F (1, 78) = 
4.414, p = .039.  Although the absolute level of judgment was low, the younger children had a 
higher mean extraordinary attribution score (M = .46, SD = .76) than the older children (M = 
0.072, SD = .31).  The LDS children (M = .38, SD = .73), attributed more extraordinary 
properties to dad than did the TC children (M = .17, SD = .46).    
15 
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Figure 3:  Attribution of extraordinary ability to dad by age and religious affiliation. 
 
 
 
3.5. Do LDS children depreciate God’s extraordinary powers? 
To examine if there were effects of religious affiliation on overall attribution of extraordinary 
ability to God, a 2-way age x religious affiliation ANOVA looking at responses to God only 
among the older and younger children was run.  Results indicated a significant main effect of 
age.  The mean attribution of extraordinary ability to God of the older children (M = 2.02, SD= 
.92) was higher than that of the younger children (M = 1.73, SD = .97) and this difference was 
significant, F (1, 78) = 4.277, p = .042.  Religious affiliation was not significant.   
A 2-way age x religious affiliation ANOVA was also run with the adults included.  As 
with the child groups, the main effect of age was significant, F (2, 121) = 19.67, p < .001, with 
16 
 an increase in attribution of extraordinary ability related to an increase in age.  No other results 
were significant.  Thus, with age, God is increasingly understood as having extraordinary power.  
However, overall, attributions of extraordinary power to God did not vary by religious affiliation. 
3.6. Domain-specific Analyses 
To determine if the distinction between God and dad held across the different domains of 
extraordinary properties, a 3-way character x attribute (domain) x age ANOVA was run.  
Looking at the child groups only, this ANOVA produced significant main effects of character, F 
(1, 80) = 403.95, p < .0001, and attribute, F (3, 240) = 42.19, p < .0001.  The mean attribution of 
extraordinary ability was highest in the domain of knowledge (M = 1.54, SD = .096) and lowest 
in the domain of biology (M = .64, SD = .083).  While there were significant interactions 
between character and age group, F (1,80) = 17.73, p < .0001, and between character and 
attribute, F (3, 240) = 22.29, p < .0001, there was no main effect of age, F (1, 80) = .23, p = .63, 
nor an attribute x age group interaction, F (3, 240) = 1.42, p = .24.  Combining the two age 
groups, Figure 4 shows the attributions by domain to God and Dad.  
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Figure 4:  Attributions to God and dad by domain. 
 
 
A 3- way age x character x attribute ANOVA was also run with the adults included.  As 
with the child groups, this analysis also produced significant main effects of character, and 
attribute, and significant interactions between character and age group and between character and 
attribute.   In contrast to the findings with the children’s groups, the main effect of age was 
significant, F (2, 124) = 7.90, p = .001, as was the attribute x age group interaction, F (6, 372) = 
5.44, p < .001.  For all age groups, the highest mean extraordinary attributions were in the 
domain of knowledge and the lowest in the domain of biology, but this contrast was especially 
strong for the youngest age group.   
Since theological differences between the two religious traditions suggest that there may 
be domain differences in attributions to God between the two religious groups, analyses were 
also conducted to look at the interaction between religion and attribute.  A 4-way character x 
attribute x religious affiliation x age ANOVA indicated significant interactions between attribute 
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 and religious affiliation, F (3, 363) = 10.63, p < .0001, attribute, age, and religious affiliation, F 
(6, 363) = 2.53, p = .020, character, attribute, and religious affiliation, F (3, 363) = 14.64, p < 
.0001, and character, attribute, age, and religious affiliation, F (6, 363) = 2.44, p = .025.  Thus, 
attributions of extraordinary abilities did vary by attribute type (or domain) and also depended on 
religious affiliation.   
The results of the previous analyses suggested that extraordinary attributions to both God 
and dad might vary by domain and that the domain of attribute interacts with religion.  To further 
explore these effects, separate ANOVAs were run for each domain of attributes. 
3.6.1. Knowledge 
To determine if knowledge constitutes a special domain, a 3-way age x religious affiliation x 
character ANOVA was run on children’s attributions in the knowledge domain.  This analysis 
yielded a significant main effect of character, F (1, 78) = 291.48, p < .0001, with children 
attributing greater extraordinary mental ability to God (M = 2.57, SD = .75) than to dad (M = .51, 
SD = .97).  The character x age group interaction was also significant, F (1, 78) = 20.42, p < 
.0001.  The youngest age group attributed extraordinary mental abilities to dad more than the 
other groups did.  In addition, religious affiliation was significant.  The LDS group (M = 1.72, 
SD = .12) had a higher mean extraordinary attribution score than the TC group (M = 1.35, SD = 
.12), and this difference was significant, F (1, 78) = 8.06, p = .006.   
A 3-way age x religious affiliation x character ANOVA was also run with adults 
included.  In this analysis, the age x religious affiliation interaction was also significant, F (2, 
121) = 3.37, p < .05.  The younger LDS children had the highest mean extraordinary attribution 
in this domain of any of the other groups.  This result is to be expected, given that this group also 
had higher attribution of extraordinary ability to dad as well.  
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 Post hoc interaction contrasts for knowledge looking at age and character, revealed no 
difference between adults and the older children, but there were significant differences between 
the younger children and adults, t (87) = 6.29 and between the younger and older children, t (80) 
= 5.16.  The difference in extraordinary attribution of knowledge between God and dad was 
narrower for the younger children than for either the older children or adults. 
Within each age group, a religious affiliation x character ANOVA was run to compare 
the two religious groups for attribution of extraordinary knowledge.  Religious differences only 
surfaced with the younger children.  The younger LDS children (M = 1.93) attributed more 
extraordinary mental abilities overall, to both characters, than did the younger TC children (M = 
1.34), and this difference was significant, F (1, 42) = 7.93, p = .007.  The character x religious 
affiliation interaction was not significant for any of the age groups. 
3.6.2. Physicality 
To examine if physicality qualifies as a separate domain, a 3-way age x religious affiliation x 
character ANOVA was computed for children’s attributions of extraordinary physicality.  The 
results indicate a significant main effect of character, F (1, 78) = 241.95, p < .0001, with God (M 
= 1.88, SD = 1.01) construed as more extraordinary than dad (M = .17, SD = .49) in this domain.  
In addition, the character x age group interaction was significant F (1, 78) = 9.67, p = .003.  
Extraordinary physical attributions to God increased with age and those for dad decreased with 
age.   
When adults were included in the analysis, there emerged a significant main effect of age 
group, F (2, 121) = 11.63, p < .0001, but not religion, F (1, 121) = .65, p = .42.   
Post hoc interaction contrasts for physicality looking at age and character, revealed no 
difference between adults and the older children, but there were significant differences between 
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 the younger children and adults, t (87) = 4.15, p < .01, and between the younger and older 
children, t (80) = 3.011, p < .01.  Again, for the domain of physicality, the difference between 
God and dad in terms of the younger children’s attributions of extraordinary ability was smaller 
than for the other age groups.  The younger children understood dad and God as more similar 
physically, than did the other age groups. 
Within each age group, a religious affiliation x character ANOVA was run to compare 
the two religious groups for attribution of extraordinary physical abilities.  Neither religious 
affiliation nor the character x religious affiliation was significant for any of the age groups. 
3.6.3. Power 
To determine if power stands as a special domain, an age x religious affiliation x character 
ANOVA was conducted that revealed a significant main effect of character, F (1, 78) = 152.09, p 
< .0001, with God (M = 1.89, SD = 1.14) receiving more attributions of extraordinary power than 
dad (M = .26, SD = .62).  The interaction between character and age was also significant, F (1, 
78) = 3.98, p = .05.  The older children had the lowest extraordinary attribution scores.  
Attributions of extraordinary power to God increased with age.   
When adults were included in the analysis, in addition to the significant results found 
with the child groups, there was also a significant main effect of religion.  The TC group (M = 
1.042, SD = .82) had lower mean attributions than the LDS group (M = 1.30, SD = .82) and this 
difference was significant, F (1, 121) = 6.40, p < .05.   In addition, the interaction between 
character and religion was marginally significant when the adults were included in the analysis, 
F (1, 121) = 3.88, p = .051.  The LDS (M = 2.33, SD = .97) had a higher attribution score for 
God than the TC (1.93, SD = 1.23). 
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 Post hoc interaction contrasts for power, looking at age and character, revealed 
significant differences between adults and the older children, t (81) = 2.27, p < .05, and between 
the adults and the younger children, t (87) = 4.46, p < .05. The difference between the younger 
children and the older children was not significant, t (80) = 1.45, p > .05.  The younger children 
believe that God and dad are closer in terms of extraordinary power than did the adults, with the 
older children falling in between the other two age groups. 
Within each age group, a religious affiliation x character ANOVA was run to compare 
the two religious groups for attribution of extraordinary power.  Religious differences only 
surfaced with the adults.  LDS adults (M = 1.531) attributed more extraordinary power than did 
the TC adults (M = 1.190), and this difference was significant, F (1, 43) = 4.73, p = .035.  In 
addition, the character x religious affiliation interaction was only significant for the adults, F (1, 
43) = 7.070, p = .011.  The LDS adults (M = 3.0, SD = .00), on average, attributed more 
extraordinary power to God than did the TC adults (M = 2.24, SD = 1.18). 
3.6.4. Biology 
To determine if biology constitutes a special domain, a 3-way age group x religious affiliation x 
character ANOVA was conducted for biology.  A significant main effect of character was found, 
F (1, 78) = 82.54, p < .0001, with God (M = 1.11, SD = .94) receiving more extraordinary 
attributions in this domain than dad (M = .17, SD = .41).  The character x religious affiliation 
interaction was significant, F (1, 78) = 8.81, p = .004.  The LDS group (M = .94, SD = .15) 
attributed fewer extraordinary attributions to God in the biological domain than did the TC group 
(M = 1.26, SD = .15).  
With the adults included, the main effect of age was significant, F (2, 121) = 5.597, p = 
.005.  The adult group (M = 1.044, SD = .58) had a higher mean attribution of extraordinary 
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 ability in this domain than the older (M = .62, SD = .63) and younger (M = .66, SD = .68) age 
groups.  In addition, the main effect for religious affiliation was also significant, F (1, 121) = 
10.265, p = .002, with the LDS groups (M = .61, SD = .63) attributing more ordinary and less 
extraordinary biological properties to both dad and God than the TC groups (M = .92, SD = .62).  
The character x age group interaction was significant, F (2, 121) = 15.65, p < .0001.  
Extraordinary attribution to God increased with age, whereas extraordinary attribution to dad 
decreased with age.  The character x age group x religious affiliation interaction was significant, 
F (2, 121) = 5.058, p = .008.  With age, the extraordinary attributions to God in the domain of 
biology increased among the TC, but remained the same among the LDS (See Figure 5).   
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Figure 5:  Attributions of extraordinary biological properties by age and religious affiliation. 
 
 
 
Post hoc interaction contrasts for biology, looking at age and character, revealed 
significant differences between adults and the older children, t (81) = 3.43, p < .01, and between 
the adults and the younger children, t (87) = 5.44, p < .01. The difference between the younger 
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 children and the older children was not significant, t (80) = 1.80, p > .05.  The younger children 
understood God and dad as being closer in terms of extraordinary biology than did the adults, 
with the older children falling in between the other two age groups.     
Within each age group a religious affiliation x character ANOVA was conducted.  Again, 
the main effect for character was significant for each age group (adult, F (1, 43) = 279.073, p < 
.0001; older, F (1, 36) = 45.592, p < .0001; younger, F (1, 42) = 35.081, p < .0001), with God 
receiving more extraordinary attributions than dad.  Significant religious affiliation x character 
interactions were found for the adults, F (1, 43) = 55.92, p < .0001, and the older children, F (1, 
36) = 5.55, p < .05, but this interaction was not significant for the younger children, F (1, 42) = 
3.035, p = .089.  There was no difference between the younger LDS and TC children in 
extraordinary biological attributions to God.  The older TC children (M = 1.53, SD = .96) 
attributed more extraordinary biological properties to God than did the older LDS children (M = 
.84, SD = 1.01). The adults demonstrated the most dramatic difference with the TC adults (M = 
2.62, SD = .68) attributing to God more extraordinary biological properties than the LDS (M = 
1.063, SD = .68). The main effect for religious affiliation was not significant for the younger 
children, F (1, 42) = 1.937, p = .171, or the older children, F (1, 36) = 3.212, p = .081, but was 
significant for the adults, F (1, 43) = 48.202, p < .0001.  Thus, an understanding of extraordinary 
biological attributes of God appears to be a late acquisition among the Tradition Christian 
groups. 
3.7. Validity of Domains 
Individual items were examined since the categories of items have not been firmly established.  
To determine if the individual items or attributes and the categories into which they were placed 
concurred with the understanding of participants, the attributes were subjected to an orthogonal 
24 
 factor analysis.  This analysis indicated that the attributes loaded onto two factors (See Table 1).  
The knowledge items of think and pray clearly loaded on to one factor.  The physicality and 
power items, as well as the knowledge item of know, loaded onto another factor.  Factor 1 
includes items that involve access to the mental activity of others.  Factor 2 consists of all other 
items, the majority of which involve interactions with the world that have physical 
consequences.  The item of knowing everything in all of the books in the world is the exception.  
In this case, God and Dad are required to have knowledge of the content of physical books rather 
than access to information contained in minds. 
 
 
Table 1:  Factor loadings 
       Factor 1  Factor 2 
Think          .815 
Pray          .875 
Know       .652 
Walk through Walls     .709 
Omnipresence      .654 
Invisibility      .496 
Magic Transformation    .765 
Lift Mountains     .831 
Healing      .556 
 
 
 
3.8. Explanations 
Although participants appeared to view God in extraordinary terms, follow-up, forced-choice 
questions were also asked to determine if these attributions were truly extraordinary or if there 
was an ordinary explanation underlying the response.  The explanations were of particular 
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 importance for the LDS sample to ascertain if attributions of extraordinary ability to God were 
explained in natural terms, as would be expected given LDS theology.  Explanation data were 
coded as follows:  a score of “1” was given if a participant responded “yes” that God could 
accomplish the given feat for extraordinary reasons, and “no” that dad could not because such a 
feat is naturally impossible.  (One child in the LDS younger group who was included in the other 
analyses was excluded in the explanation ANOVA because the child did not answer any of the 
follow-up forced choice questions). 
 To examine the data using this stricter coding, a 2-way age x religious affiliation 
ANOVA was run for the explanation data.  This ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of 
age, F (2, 120) = 34.09, p < .0001, and age x religious affiliation interaction, F (2, 120) = 4.92, p 
= .009.  Figure 6 shows the mean number of supernatural explanations for attributions of 
extraordinary ability to God.  Whereas the LDS and TC younger children and adult groups had 
similar mean supernatural scores for God, the TC older children had a higher mean supernatural 
score for God (M = 5.63, SD = 2.65) than the LDS older children (M = 3.16, SD = 2.41).  
Whereas the LDS adults demonstrate a view of God as highly extraordinary, the responses of the 
older LDS children indicate a more natural understanding of God’s extraordinary abilities, in line 
with a face-value interpretation of LDS theology.   
3.9. Theological Tenets 
To more carefully examine the possible theological differences regarding specific items, chi-
square analyses were run, comparing the religious groups solely in their judgments about God’s 
distinctive powers.  For the first set of chi-square analyses, involving items in the domains of 
knowledge, physicality, and power, responses were coded as God only (is able to do the feat, 
whether or not it is for extraordinary reasons) (“1”) vs. all other responses (“0”).  For the 
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 analyses of the biological items, responses were coded as Dad only (has the natural 
characteristic) (“1”) vs.  all other responses (“0”).  Significant religious differences only 
appeared among adults, appearing for the following items: omnipresence or being able to be in 
two places at once (χ2  (1) = 9.10, p < .01), the ability to become invisible (χ2  (1) = 8.032, p < 
.01), magical transformation of a rock into a puppy (χ2  (1) = 9.87, p < .01), healing a person 
born with no eyes (χ2  (1) = 6.20,  p < .025), having once been a baby (χ2  (1) = 20.86, p < .001), 
and  having a body (χ2  (1) = 27.022, p < .001).  These results correspond with the subtle 
theological differences (i.e., God’s physical status) that appear to be late-emerging.  Table 2 
presents the percentage of adults within each religious tradition that responded that God only had 
the extraordinary ability.  LDS adults more consistently attribute powers to God, including 
invisibility, than do TC adults, with the exception of omnipresence.  Table 3 shows the 
percentage of adults within each tradition that responded that Dad only had the natural 
characteristic.  Although, for the LDS, God was once a baby and has a body, he nevertheless is 
regarded as radically different from an ordinary human being.  
 
 
Table 2: Percentage of adults within each religious tradition responding that God only has the extraordinary 
ability 
        LDS  TC 
 
Omnipresence       62.5  96.6 
Invisibility       100  62.1 
Magical Transformation     100  54.5 
Healing       100  69.0 
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Table 3:  Percentage of adults within each religious tradition responding that dad only has the natural 
biological property 
 
        LDS  TC 
 
Was once a Baby      12.5  82.8   
Lives with a Body      6.3  86.2 
 
 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
Overall, the results suggest that regardless of religious background, even the youngest children 
distinguished the extraordinary powers of God from the natural constraints of Dad.  Regardless 
of religious background, children were most prepared to understand the extraordinary mental 
powers of God and least prepared to understand disembodied attributes.  Regardless of religion, 
there was little age change in the understanding of God’s extraordinary mental abilities.  
Children appeared least ready to understand the abstract, disembodied attributes of God.  LDS 
children did show some tendency to attribute extraordinary properties to dad.  In addition, LDS 
children did not demonstrate a more anthropomorphic God concept than Traditional Christian 
children, but did show a tendency to view God as more extraordinary.  Despite the general LDS 
view of God as extraordinary, with development, the LDS maintain that God is embodied, in line 
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 with LDS theology.  In contrast, abstract disembodied conceptions of God uniquely emerge late 
in development among traditional Christians.  
Consistent with intuitive theory, the results indicate that children appear prepared to 
distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary qualities of dad and God regardless of religious 
background.  The LDS children were no more or less anthropomorphic in their understanding of 
God than their TC counterparts.  In addition, the results suggest that God concepts are more 
differentiated than Piaget suggests.  That is, God concepts are not generalized supernatural 
agents, but involve properties and abilities that fall into different domains.  The different aspects 
of God concepts do not emerge all at once, but follow different developmental timelines.  
Children appear to more readily understand the extraordinary mental attributes of God than other 
supernatural attributes in other domains.  Consistent with Piagetian tradition, however, the 
results also suggest that conceiving of God as disembodied is a late, theologically dependent 
achievement. 
Although overall the LDS children did not demonstrate a more anthropomorphic God 
concept than the Traditional Christian children, the younger LDS children did attribute more 
extraordinary abilities to dad.  While these attributions were absolutely small in number, they 
were relatively higher.  This result is in line with LDS theology in which both God as a Heavenly 
Father and the traditional family are emphasized as important.  Regardless of religion, children 
did more readily appreciate God’s ability to violate mental constraints than physical or bodily 
constraints.  In this sense, they demonstrated some anthropomorphism in their God concepts.  
There are two possible explanations for this result.  First, the discrepancy between mental and 
physical properties may have to do with how God is represented by the culture.  Perhaps 
narratives about God told to Traditional Christian children focus on God’s extraordinary mental 
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 abilities (God’s abilities of receiving prayers and engaging in mental communication) and 
downplay God’s immateriality.   Thus, children may have more practice with representing 
extraordinary mental abilities than abilities in other domains. 
An alternative explanation would be that extraordinary mental properties are more readily 
understood by young children than are extraordinary physical properties.  Young children’s 
relatively undeveloped understanding of mental processes may allow them to readily acquire a 
God concept that involves extraordinary abilities.  In contrast, young children have had much 
experience with the physical world and it may be difficult to override that understanding in 
reasoning about agents with extraordinary physical properties.  That is, violations of expectations 
concerning the physical world may be more difficult to represent. 
 The results of the present study, specifically concerning the mental domain, support other 
research that has demonstrated that an understanding of extraordinary mental ability may be 
readily acquired (Barrett & Richert, 2003; Barrett et al., 2001; Gimenez et al., 2000).  Barrett and 
Richert have construed this readiness as “preparedness,” or the idea that certain concepts are 
more easily acquired given their existence early in development.  More specifically, Barrett and 
Richert have hypothesized that children go through a period in which they think God and 
humans have unconstrained mental powers.  According to this “preparedness” perspective, 
children’s knowledge in certain areas is underdetermined in such a way that some supernatural 
concepts have an advantage early in development.  In contrast to Piaget’s notion, this theory 
suggests that young children might possess a more abstract understanding of God than 
previously thought.  The results of the present study support the idea of preparedness in the 
mental domain, but call into question the limits of such ready acquisition in other domains.  It 
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 has yet to be determined whether and in what domains beyond the mental this same preparedness 
exists. 
In addition, the results of the present study add to other recent research on infant 
cognition and children’s afterlife beliefs that suggests that dualistic thinking comes easily.  
Kuhlmeier, Bloom, and Wynn (2004) propose that five-month-old infants have separate modes 
of construal for inanimate objects and for humans.  Their research suggests that these infants 
understand that inanimate objects follow laws of continuous motion, but they do not apply these 
constraints to humans.  Bering and Bjorkland’s (2003) research on afterlife concepts also 
suggests that the mental domain is separable from the physical and biological domains.  They 
found that young children understand mental activity to continue after bodily functions cease.  
Thus the mental domain appears to be special, particularly for supernatural concepts. 
 Some aspects of God concepts may be readily acquired, however theology and religious 
education may also play a role in their development.  Despite the anthropomorphism apparent in 
LDS theology, overall the LDS participants construed God as more extraordinary than the TC, 
especially the adults.  This surprising result may be due to the subtleties of theology as well as 
the later development of personal beliefs.  In the LDS tradition, miracles are natural events that 
appear supernatural.  Perhaps the responses of the LDS adults focus on the appearance of the 
extraordinary rather than on God’s limitations.  In addition, the TC adults may hold a view of 
God that is less extraordinary or more removed from interaction with the world.  The results 
involving explanations suggest that the older LDS children appear to explain God in ordinary 
terms in line with a literal interpretation of certain aspects of LDS religious instruction.  They 
are, however, not quite grasping the idea that the ordinary explanations of God’s abilities are 
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 really supernatural, as demonstrated by the responses of LDS adults.  These more subtle 
understandings may come later.  
 Although the current study provides insight into what children and adults think God and 
dad can do, it also has a few limitations that will need to be addressed in future studies.  The 
verbal demands of the questions may have led to an underestimate of what children actually 
think about God.  In addition, the forced-choice questions did not guarantee insight into 
confirming that a participant thought that God or dad does things naturally or supernaturally.  It 
is also not clear what type of God concept, a memorized, theologically correct one, or an on-line 
one, the task elicited.  The children in the study were also older than those in previous studies.  
Perhaps younger children would show a more pronounced confusion between God and dad in 
terms of extraordinary abilities.  Additionally, younger children may view the domains of 
abilities differently than older children. 
 Another limitation of the study is that the comparison between the religious traditions is 
not a clear-cut comparison.  The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is more 
homogenous in its religious instruction than are the churches of the Traditional Christians 
sampled in this study.  Although this discrepancy might be a limitation, research by Gimenez et 
al (2000) suggests that explicit religious instruction does not appear to exert a strong influence 
on the development of the God concept.  Children in both religious and secular schools learn 
about God from the surrounding culture. 
 Furthermore, the individual items may have been problematic.  The domains and the 
items within them were drawn from traditional Christian theology and intuitive theory and might 
not adequately represent the way in which children, or adults for that matter, construe God.  
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 Also, the questions were not able to capture the subtleties of the theologies of both religious 
traditions. 
 Despite these limitations, the present study adds to the few previous studies that have 
addressed this topic by demonstrating that God concepts are differentiated and acquired in a 
piece-meal fashion.  In addition, the comparison of the development of LDS and TC God 
concepts suggests that certain aspects of the theologically correct view of God appear to emerge 
late in development, whereas other aspects appear to be easily acquired by young children.  
Future studies are needed to determine domain differences in the readiness of acquisition of 
supernatural concepts, but the present study provides an initial step. 
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APPENDIX  
 
 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
Knowledge Items 
Thinking:   Let's think about something really strange.  Can you think about a flying cat?  Are 
you thinking about a flying cat right now?  Now I wonder who knows what you're thinking.  
 
Does ______ know that you are thinking of a flying cat right now? 
 
If YES,      If NO, 
O.K.  So, _____ knows what you are thinking. O.K.  So, _____ doesn’t know 
  what you are thinking. 
Did he find out what is going on inside your  Is it because there is no way he can tell 
head, all by himself without doing anything,       what's going on in your head      
      
or did someone tell him?            or is it because he isn’t looking?        
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   Prayer:  (Show picture of child praying).  This is Sarah. She wants to have her very own elf.  
She didn't tell anybody what she wants.  She is praying for an elf. but she is not saying the words 
out loud. 
   Does _______ know what Sarah is praying for?  
 
If YES,      If NO,     
O.K.  So, _____ knows what Sarah  O.K.  So, _____ doesn’t know what Sarah is 
is praying for.      praying for. 
 
Can he tell what she is praying     Is it because there is no way he    
all by himself without doing anything      can tell what she is praying          
   
or does he have to listen with his ears?   Or because he is not listening with his ears?  
                 
  Knowing:  See this library here (show picture).  This is the biggest library in the world.  It has 
lots and lots and lots of books in it.  There are lots of libraries and lots of books in the world, 
right? 
 
  Does ______ know everything that is in all the books in the world?   
 
 If YES,      If NO,       
O.K.  So ______ knows everything in all the O.K.  So ______ doesn’t know what's in all 
books in the world.        the books in the world. 
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Did he find out by reading all the books      Is it because there is no way he          
with his eyes      could know what's in all the books 
 or did he just know what’s              
inside all the books without looking?   or because he isn't paying attention?   
 
Physicality Items 
  Ability to walk through walls:  See that wall over there?  It’s a very hard wall. 
   Could ______ go through that wall?  
 
If YES,      If NO,      
O.K.  So _____ can go through that wall. O.K.  So _____ can’t go through the wall. 
       
Would he have to break down the wall Is it because his body is not strong enough 
to go through,                                                to go through the wall                          
 
or could he go through                                      or because there is no                          
without anything happening to the wall?  way a body can go through a wall? 
 
  Omnipresence:  Sometimes _____ is at home, sometimes he’s at work, and sometimes he is at 
the store. 
 Could _______ be at home, at work, and at the store all at the same time? 
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 If YES,      If NO, 
O.K.  So _____ can be all those places  O.K.  So _____ can’t be in all those 
at the same time.     places at the same time. 
 
Would he have to go real fast to every  Is it because he can’t run fast enough 
place,          to get to all those places                       
 
 or could he be in all those places at       or is it because 
the same time?nobody can be in three places at the   same time?  
  Invisibility:   
  Can _______ make himself invisible so that no one can see him? 
 
If YES,      If NO, 
O.K.  So _____ can make himself invisible. O.K.  So _____ can’t make himself invisible. 
 
Would he have to do it by hiding       Is it because he can’t hide     
under something  
 
or could he make      or because nobody can          
himself invisible without hiding?   make himself invisible?   
 
Power Items 
  Magical Transformation:  See this? (Show child a stone or picture of a stone).  What is it? 
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  Could _______ turn this stone into a real live puppy?  
 
If YES,      If NO, 
O.K.  So _____ can turn this stone    O.K.  So _____ can’t turn this stone 
into a real live puppy.     into a real live puppy. 
 
Could he do it just by wishing it           Is it because he never learned how to     
       make a puppy from a stone                 
or    
would he have to use his hands to       or because                                               
shape the stone into a puppy? you can’t make a puppy from a stone?   
  Physical Power:  See this?  (Show child a picture of a mountain).  What is it? 
 
  Could _______ lift up this mountain all by himself? 
 
If YES,      If NO, 
O.K.  So _____ can lift the mountain all   O.K.  So _____ can’t lift up the  
by himself.      mountain all by himself. 
 
Does he use big muscles    Is it because his muscles aren't big   
       enough 
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 or does he do it just by wishing it?   or because no muscles are                 
       big enough to lift a mountain? 
 
  Healing:  See this?  (Show picture).  This person has been blind since s/he was born.  S/he was 
born without any eyes.  No doctors can fix her/his eyes. 
   Could _______ make this person able to see?  
 
If YES,      If NO, 
O.K.  So _____ can make this   O.K.  So _____ can’t make this 
person able to see.     person able to see. 
 
Would he do it with a medicine          Is it because he doesn't have the       
       right medicine to do it 
     
or could he do it just by wishing?       or because there is no medicine 
       that can make eyes?                                        
 
Biological Items   
  Was ______ once a little baby,   
  or was ______ always the way he is now?    
 
 
Does ______ have a real body with arms and legs and everything     
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 or does _____ live without a real body?      
 
 
  Does ______ have to eat and drink      
 or does _____ live without eating and drinking?      
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